important development in recent years is the United States' growing current account deficit, which makes the country the world's largest debtor and raises fears for the dollar's stability. In contrast to the 1960s, capital outflows from the US reflected higher US saving rates with more favourable implications for debt sustainability.
In Chapter 2, The Anatomy of the Gold Pool, Eichengreen focuses on the experience of the Gold Pool (1961) (1962) (1963) (1964) (1965) (1966) (1967) (1968) , which he believes is crucial for understanding the Bretton Woods system but has been weakly documented. The Gold Pool was established to regulate the London price of gold and to stabilise the market. The Pool failed because it was difficult for each member country, in particular France, to resist the temptation to convert dollars into gold for an indefinite period. Based on the Gold Pool experience, Eichengreen explains why it is difficult to hold together the cartel of Asian central banks that support the dollar. Besides the lack of collective interest, opaqueness in the reserve-management policies of each of the central banks and absence of an enforcement mechanism complicates the task of holding together the cartel. Furthermore, the action of some major oil producing countries of converting more dollars into gold means more dollars must be absorbed by Asian central banks to prevent the dollar's fall. But, this action is costly and unlikely to be sustained. Eichengreen argues that gradually Asian countries are moving away from the model of an export-led growth economy supported by an undervalued exchange rate, with some countries more ready than others to adjust to a fall in the dollar in the future. However, the Gold Pool collapse does not suggest the early collapse of the Asian cartel of central banks that supports the dollars.
In Chapter 3, How to Exit a Currency Peg: Japan and the End of the Bretton Woods System, Eichengreen discusses the controversy over China's exchange rate policy, calls for yuan revaluation, and evaluates Japan's experience exiting the peg system in 1971. He argues that the revaluation must be undertaken carefully. Although Japan was more advanced than China is now, Japan's experience provides insight into China's monetary options today. Graphs, tables and regressions in this chapter are very well-explained and useful. However, the finding in Table 3 is based on spurious OLS regression estimation. For a series with a mixed order of integration, an estimation using ARDL would have provided more robust estimates. Similarly, the estimation in Table 3 .8 would be have been more credible if Eichengreen had included diagnostic test checks for each of the regressions. Noteworthy also is Eichengreen's advocacy of yuan revaluation.
In Chapter 4, Sterling's Past, Dollar's Future, Eichengreen addresses the use of the sterling as a reserve currency in the past and its collapse. The discussion traces how the dollar became the dominant reserve-currency. Despite the global imbalances, the dollar is still the dominant reserve currency for the world. Nevertheless, he disagrees that there can only be one reserve currency at a given point in time. He sees the euro as the potential candidate in year 2020 or 2040 and rejects other currencies. Unfortunately, no recent data on the euro is given in this chapter to back his claim. The data in Table 4 .2 only shows a small role for the euro in 2004. He explains that large current account deficits and rapidly growing net foreign debt threaten to undermine the dollar. Foreigners will grow reluctant to hold more dollars and dollar-denominated assets. However, he is optimistic that the US current account deficit can be brought under control. So far Eichengreen is right in his prediction. The dollar is continuously falling, with the fall apparently caused by high deficits in the US economy. Currently, the nation is expected to accumulate debt as much as USD14.3 trillion.
Meanwhile, China, Russia, Japan, France and Brazil have increasingly replaced the dollar with a basket of other currencies and gold.
It is worth noting that Eichengreen's discussions do not incorporate the recent crisis in the euro economy. Greece, Ireland, Spain and Portugal were badly affected by the recent global financial crisis 2007-2008 and required huge bailouts from the European Central Bank. This event has negative effects on the euro and has given rise to uncertainty in the euro in the future. Paul Krugman in the New York Times Magazine, 12 January 2011, argues that Europe is no different from the Unites States. Both suffered a severe slump in their economies from the recent global financial crisis. Both the United States and Britain have been running deficits, as a percentage of GDP, that are comparable to the deficits in Spain and Ireland. He is sceptical about the euro's future. Indeed, he does not believe the idea of a European single currency that will work as well as the dollar. Understanding this, Britain favours its freely floating national currency.
Eicheengreen is not alone in his assessment of the dollar's future. In a World Bank report, Global Development Horizons 2011-Multipolarity: The New Global Economy, the future international monetary system is predicted to be dominated by a multicurrency system or multipolar international currencies and the euro is the close rival to the dollar. However, the most likely currencies serving as the key international currency are the dollar, the euro and the yuan. This is based on the growing roles of the Unites States, the European countries and China as the major growth poles in 2025. The dollar is expected to lose its status as the dominant reserve currency by 2025 while the yuan will take a longer time to establish its position. Although it will take some time for China to reform its less-developed and restricted financial market, reform is inevitable, in particular to address the problem of currency mismatch. At present, some measures to internationalise the yuan have been introduced by Chinese authorities. The report is positive on the prospect for the euro. The European integration will lead to reforms that overcome the problems of sovereign debt crises of its member countries and moral hazard created by bailouts of heavily indebted governments. It rejects the SDR, a single multilateral reserve currency as the future international reserve currency due to the difficulty of achieving coordination to manage the reserve currency.
Basically, the book discusses the issues in a timely and insightful manner. It is compact and factual. It gives a neat and broad perspective on global imbalances, the Bretton Wood system, the dollar as the world's reserve currency and the yuan revaluation. The book is valuable to students, scholars and researchers in economics who want to know more about the current world economy.
However, the use of the endnote is too excessive and this distracts from the pleasure of reading the book. Referring to the endnotes very often interrupts the flow of the reading and sometimes the information is trivial, for example, the source of a reference. It would have been better if the source of reference had been cited in the discussion page. Also some of the explanations in the endnotes could have been better explained in the chapter. For example, the explanation in endnotes 59 to 76 would be more appropriate if explained in the chapter rather than as an endnote.
Some of the discussions are explained using long, complex sentences. This may confuse the reader who will require more time to understand the message. For example "the result was a commitment to the early restoration of current account convertibility, which occurred
